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THE TRIPLE A APPROACH TO THE GOOD LIFE, 
AND THE RESONANCE CONCEPTION
Abstract. — A	society	is	modern	when	it	operates	in	a	mode	of	dynamic	stabilization,	i.e.,	




structural requirement of growth, acceleration and innovation into a strategic necessity in 
the	humans’	search	for	a	good	life.	Thirdly,	it	presents	an	alternative	conception	of	the	good	
life, based on the concept of resonance, which also proves to be an indispensable tool for a 
critique	of	social	conditions.
Keywords. — resonance, good life, dynamic stabilization, triple A approach, alienation, critique 
of social conditions
Hartmut Rosa, Stabilisation dynamique, l’approche du « triple A » du bien-être et la 
conception de la résonance
Résumé. — Une	société	est	moderne	lorsqu’elle	opère	dans	un	mode	de	stabilisation	dynamique,	
c’est-à-dire	lorsqu’elle	exige	systématiquement	la	croissance,	l’innovation	et	l’accélération	afin	de	
maintenir son statu quo	socio-économique	et	institutionnel.	Dans	ce	cadre,	cet	essai	présente	
une analyse de la société moderne expliquant les caractéristiques structurelles qui conduisent 
à	ce	cycle	d’escalade.	Deuxièmement,	il	identifie	les	«	impératifs	culturels	»	correspondants	qui	
traduisent	 l’exigence	structurelle	de	 la	croissance,	de	 l’accélération	et	de	 l’innovation	en	une	
nécessité	stratégique	pour	 les	 individus	dans	 leur	quête	d’une	«	bonne	»	vie.	Troisièmement,	
il	présente	une	conception	alternative	du	bien-être,	fondée	sur	le	concept	de	résonance,	qui	
s’avère	aussi	un	outil	indispensable	pour	une	critique	des	conditions	sociales.
Mots clés. — résonance, bonne vie, stabilisation dynamique, approche du triple A, aliénation, 
critique des conditions sociales
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One very curious but consistent fact about late modern life is that almost irrespective of their values, status and moral commitments, subjects feel notoriously short on time and tirelessly pressed to hurry (Gershuny, 
2000;	Robinson,	Godbey,	1997;	Rosa,	2005;	Wajcman,	2014).	Individuals	from	Rio	
to	New	York,	from	Los	Angeles	to	Moscow	and	Tokyo	feel	caught	in	a	rat-race	of	
daily	routines.	No	matter	how	fast	they	run,	they	close	their	day	as	subjects of guilt: 
they almost never succeed in working off their to do lists.	Thus,	even	and	especially	
if	they	have	enough	money	and	wealth,	they	are	indebted	temporally.	This	is	what	
perhaps characterizes the everyday predicament of the overwhelming majority 
of subjects in Western capitalist societies most aptly: amidst monetary and 
technological	affluence,	 they	are	close	to	temporal	 insolvency.	We	need	more	
time to do our work properly, we need more time to improve our skills and 
knowledge, to renew our hard- and software, we need more time to care for our 
kids and elderly parents, more time for our friends and relatives, for our house 
or	flat	and	for	our	body,	and	finally,	we	need	more	time	to	come	to	terms	with	
ourselves,	our	minds	or	souls	or	psyche.	The	problem,	in	fact,	is	that,	in	all	of	these	
respects (and probably many more), there are legitimate expectations directed 
towards	us	by	ourselves	or	by	others	–	expectations	 turning	 into	obligations	
which we feel we really should meet, and the neglect of which will be held against 
us	in	one	context	or	another	(Rosa,	2017).	Of course, I should have done it long 
ago,	but	 I	 just	did	not	find	the	time	yet, has become something like the default-
perspective with which we move from context to context. Thus, just as a person 
who	is	indebted	financially	permanently	seeks	to	gain,	save	or	earn	a	little	money	





good life, for how we (want to) live our lives is equivalent to how we (want to) 
spend	our	time.	Hence,	the	vexing	question	is	this:	How	did	we	get	here?	How	
is this logic of escalatory acceleration tied up with our conceptions of the good 
life?	And,	first	and	foremost:	How	can	we	find	a	way	out?
In	this	essay,	I	want	to	present,	first,	an	analysis	of	modern	society	that	explains	
the structural features which lead into an escalatory cycle of incessant growth, 
acceleration	and	innovation.	In	the	second	step,	I	will	identify	two	corresponding	
cultural “imperatives for growth” that provide the hamster-wheel of modern 
social life with motivational energy, or, put differently, that translate the structural 
requirement of growth, acceleration and innovation into a strategic necessity 
in	our	search	for	the	good	life.	In	the	third	and	last	step	of	this	paper,	I	want	to	
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Dynamic Stabilization and the escalatory logic  
of modernity
As I have argued at length elsewhere (Rosa, 2015; 2016: 671-705; Rosa, Dörre, 
Lessenich,	2017),	the	defining	feature	of	a	modern	society	(or,	in	fact,	a	modern	
institution) can be seen in the fact that it can only stabilize itself dynamically, or more 
precisely, that it can only reproduce its structure through an increase of some sort 
–	 quite	 regularly,	 through	 (economic)	 growth,	 (technological)	 acceleration,	 and/
or	higher	rates	of	(cultural)	 innovation.	Hence,	 I	suggest	the	following	definition:	
A society is modern when it operates in a mode of dynamic stabilization, i.e., when it 
systematically requires growth, innovation and acceleration for its structural reproduction 




is stable? I have already dealt with this problem at great length in my book on 
social	acceleration	(Rosa,	2005).	With	structural	reproduction	and	reification	of	the	
status	quo	I	mean,	firstly,	the	stabilization	of	the	basic	institutional	fabric	of	society,	





of accumulation and distribution: the logic of capital accumulation and the very 
processes	of	growth,	acceleration,	activation	and	innovation	themselves.	Of	course,	
many political, economic, or educational institutions change their shape, form or 
composition	over	time.	But	what	does	not	change	are	the	systemic	imperatives	and	
requirements	for	augmentation,	increase	and	escalation.	This	answer,	however,	raises	
another serious question: Is modern society, then, equivalent to capitalist society? Do 
I simply mean “capitalism” when I refer to the basic structure of modern society?
The answer is: capitalism is a central motor, but dynamic stabilization extends well 
beyond	the	economic	sphere.	When	we	look	at	it	historically,	it	turns	out	that	the	
shift from an adaptive to a dynamic mode of stabilization can be observed as a 
systematic transformation in all cardinal spheres of social life that occurs, despite 
some historic predecessors, mainly from the 18th	century	onwards.	Most	obviously,	
of	course,	it	can	be	found	in	the	realm	of	the	economy.	The	accounts	of	both	Max	
Weber	and	Karl	Marx	vividly	focus	on	this	transformation.	In	a	capitalist	economy,	
virtually all economic activity depends on the expectation and promise of an increase 
in	the	sense	of	profit	of	one	sort	or	another.	Money-Commodity-Money’	(m-c-m’),	is	
the	short	formula	for	this,	where	the	prime	signifies	the	increased	return.	It	is	realized	
through innovation (of product or process) and through acceleration, mostly in the 




the details of economic theory here, which can show that the need for innovation, 
acceleration and growth really is intrinsic to the logic of capitalist production, to the 
logic	of	competition	and	even	to	the	logic	of	the	monetary	and	the	credit	systems.	The	
net result of it is that without permanent growth, acceleration and innovation, at least 
under	late-modern	conditions	of	globalized	economic	and	financial	markets,	capitalist	
economies cannot maintain their institutional structures: jobs are lost, companies close 




in a narrow sense depends on the logic of escalation, which is the consequence 
of the mode of dynamic stabilization, but also the welfare-state and the system of 




democratic system that requires dynamic stabilization through repeated voting every 
four	or	five	years,	but,	much	more	dramatically:	elections	can	only	be	won	on	the	
basis of political programs that promise an increase	–	an	increase	in	income,	or	in	jobs,	
or	in	universities,	high	school	diplomas,	hospital	beds,	etc.	(Luhmann,	1981).
Even if within one national economy degrowth in the sense of a recession might 
persist for a few years or even decades, it could not persist for long on a world-
wide	scale.	And	even	if	the	gross	domestic	product	in	a	country	does	not	increase	
for a couple of years, pressures for acceleration and innovation remain unaffected, 
and as a rule, non-growth or de-growth is coupled with elements of cannibalization 





conception of science and knowledge displays a quite similar shift from an adaptive 
to a dynamic mode of stabilization which transforms its institutional order: in non-
modern social formations, knowledge most often is considered and treated as a social 
possession, or as a treasure, that carefully needs to be preserved and handed down 
from	one	generation	to	the	next.	This	knowledge	in	many	cultures	is	traced	back	to	
some ancient or sacred source, for example to “holy scriptures”, or “the wisdom of 
the ancient”, and there almost always is an attempt to preserve this knowledge in 
a	“pure”	form.	It	is	knowledge	about	how things are done –	how	one	builds	a	home,	
or produces clothing and food, for example, when to sow or to reap or how and 
when	to	hunt	game,	and,	not	least,	how	to	perform	the	sacred	rituals.	Knowledge	
is transferred from one generation to the next either simply as learning by doing 
and performing, or in some form of schola.	By	contrast,	modern	societies	shift	from	
Wissen (knowledge) in this sense to Wissenschaft	(science).	As	the	second	part	in	
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the German word indicates quite nicely, the central form and art of knowledge in 
modernity is not about preservation and schooling, it is no longer about treasuring, 
but about systematically pushing the borders, increasing the volume of the known, 
transgressing	into	the	yet	unknown.	Science	is	about	looking	further	into	the	universe	
than ever before, piercing deeper into the micro-structures and particles of matter, 
closer	 into	the	workings	of	 life,	etc.	The	sacred	spaces	of	knowledge	have	moved	
from the schola to the laboratory: science is reproduced dynamically, through growth, 
increase	and	transgression.	Just	as	the	propelling	dynamics	of	m-c-m’	lies	at	the	heart	
of modern economy, a similar process of knowledge-research-increased knowledge 
(k-r-k’)	provides	the	basis	for	modern	science.
In Science as a Vocation, Max Weber (1946: 138) has formulated this point quite forcefully:
“In	science,	each	of	us	knows	that	what	he	has	accomplished	will	be	antiquated	in	ten,	twenty,	fifty	






Finally, in the arts, the modus operandi resembles this very logic of increase and 
transgression,	too.	After	millennia	of	a	predominantly	mimetic	art,	 for	which	the	
goal of artistic creation is the emulation either of nature or of some traditional style 




In this way, the logic of dynamic stabilization has become the hallmark of modern 
society	 in	 toto.	The	circle	of	 acceleration	between	 technological	 acceleration,	 the	
acceleration of social change and the corresponding acceleration of the pace of 
life that results from dynamic stabilization has become a self-propelling mechanism 
in	modernity	(Rosa,	2005:	151-159).	It	maintains	the	socio-economic	status	quo	as	
well as the institutional structure of the market system, of the welfare-state as well as 
of science, art and education, via a constant escalation of its productive power and 
substantive	output.	Needless	to	say,	the	stability	achieved	thereby	is	robust	enough	to	
keep the machines going for more than 250 years now, but nevertheless increasingly 
fragile, too: it can be undermined anytime either because of its externalities, 
e.g.	 in	 ecological	 costs,	 because	 of	 a	 failure	 of	 social	 integration	 despite	 growth	
and	 acceleration	 (as	 e.g.	 in	 phenomena	 of	“jobless	 growth”	 and	 increased	 social	
precarization;	cf.	Dörre,	2015),	or	because	of	problems	created	by	desynchronization	
(Rosa,	2015).	At	this	point,	perhaps,	it	is	sufficient	to	see	that	dynamic	stabilization	
resembles a ride on a bicycle: the faster the bike wheels, the more robust it is in its 




Of course, no social formation ever could stabilize and reproduce itself in a merely 
static	way.	All	societies	occasionally	need	change	and	development.	However,	in	non-
modern social formations, the mode of stabilization is adaptive: growth, acceleration 
or	innovations	can	and	do	occur,	but	they	are	either	accidental	or	adaptive,	i.e.,	they	
are	reactions	to	changes	in	the	environment	(e.g.,	climate	changes	or	natural	disasters	
such	 as	 droughts,	 fires,	 earthquakes,	 or	 the	 appearance	of	 new	diseases	 or	 new	
enemies,	etc.).	Dynamic	stabilization	as	I	use	it	here,	by	contrast,	 is	defined	by	the	
systematic requirement for increase, augmentation, and acceleration as an internal, 
endogenous	requirement.
Systemic requirements and ethical imperatives:  
The Triple A Approach to the Good Life
If we accept that the escalatory logics implied in dynamic stabilization is a systemic 
requirement and structural necessity of modern society, the core question that 
arises is how the resulting growth- and speed-imperatives are connected to, or 
translated	 into	modern	subjects’	conceptions	of	the	good	 life.	For	obviously,	 it	
would be highly implausible to suppose that individuals are merely the victims, or 
the	passive	receivers,	of	those	requirements.
Surely, in the end, it is us humans who have to achieve growth, acceleration and 
innovation through incessant (self-) optimization, and we play this escalatory 
game through the endless accumulation of economic, cultural, social and bodily 
capital.	But	in	order	to	fully	grasp	the	corresponding	processes	of	translating	the	
structural requirements into personal aspirations, we need to understand some 
peculiar	features	of	the	cultural	predicament	of	modernity	first.
The most important of these is ethical pluralism and what Alasair MacIntyre (1990) 
once called the privatization of the good.	 For	 in	 parallel	with	 the	 structural	 and	
institutional shift towards dynamic stabilization, modern societies came to accept 
that	they	could	not	reach	a	binding	consensus	on	the	definition	of	the	good	life;	
that there is no way to rationally arbitrate between competing “comprehensive 
conceptions	of	the	good”,	as	John	Rawls	(1971)	termed	it.	Thus,	ethical	pluralism	
has	become	the	basic	cultural	condition	of	modernity.	Whether	one	should	abide	
by a religious belief, and if so, by which one, whether one should strive to develop 
political, artistic or intellectual capacities, whether one should marry and have kids 
or not, and all the other small and big questions about what kind of life one should 
lead,	about	leading	a	life	as	such	–	e.g.	whether	music	should	be	important,	whether	
literature should be a part of life, whether the town or the country is preferable, 
whether	the	local	soccer	team	was	important	or	not	–	were	turned	into	strictly	
private	questions.	You’ll	have	to	find	out	for	yourself! is the standard answer to all of 
them, and it is not just the pro-forma line taken in families and class-rooms and 
even	in	the	local	pubs	in	order	to	ensure	civility.	In	fact,	that	the	question	of	the	
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good should be an intimate, strictly private and individual matter is itself one of 
the	founding	and	grounding	ethical	convictions	of	modernity.	If	a	kid	asks	what	to	
do	with	his	or	her	life	–	questions	such	as:	Should	I	play	soccer,	or	the	flute?	Should	I	
be interested in politics? Should I believe in God? Whom should I marry? Where should 
I live?	–	teachers,	friends	and	family	will	be	sure	to	offer	their	advice,	but	they	will	
almost inevitably rush to add: Just	find	out	for	yourself,	listen	to	your	heart,	come	to	
know your talents and your yearnings.	Thus,	 the	 good	 life	 has	 become	 the	most	
intimately	private	matter	of	all	 things.	 It	has	become	even	more	delicate	by	the	
fact that, by consequence of dynamic stabilization, the background conditions of 
the life to be led are changing quickly: You can never know what you will want, and 
what you will need, in the future. The world will change, and your own outlook on life will 
change, too. Hence, the answer to “what kind of life should I strive for?” has become 
very	elusive,	shrouded	in	uncertainty.	However,	it	is	not	that	no	ethical	advice	can	
be	given	at	all.	Quite	to	the	contrary:	modern	society	might	not	have	an	answer	
to what the good life is or what it consists in, but it has a very clear-cut answer 
to what the preconditions for living a good life are, and to what to do for meeting 
them.	Secure	the	resources	you	might	need	for	living	your	dream	(whatever	that	might	
be)!	has	become	the	overruling	rational	imperative	of	modernity.	
Harvard Philosopher John Rawls in his most remarkable Theory of Justice has 
outlined	this	predicament	perhaps	 in	 the	most	straightforward	way.	There	will	be	
no agreement on the comprehensive doctrines of the good, he says, but there 
are a number of “primary goods” of which to have more clearly is better than to 
have less,	irrespective	of	what	your	conception	of	the	good	is.	Such	goods	are,	first	
and foremost, our freedoms and rights, but also our economic means, our cultural 
capacities and knowledge, our social networks, our social status and the recognition 
we	earn,	but	also	our	health,	etc.	(cf.	Rawls,	1971).	No matter what the future might 
bring, it will help if you have money, rights, friends, health, knowledge.	





Thus, when we consult the books in the self-help section of bookstores for happiness 
and	the	good	life,	we	find	that	the	increase	in	those	“primary	goods”	or	resources	
more often than not is equated with an increase in the quality of life as such: the 
secrets	to	a	good	and	happy	life,	we	are	assured,	can	be	unraveled	if	we	find	out	how 
to get rich, how to be more healthy, or attractive, or have more friends, or how to acquire 
better skills, memory and knowledge, etc.	 In	 short,	 the	 aspirations	 and	dreams,	 the	
strivings and yearnings, the fears and anxieties that have come to guide our actions 
and	decisions	are	firmly	fixed	on	our	equipment	with	resources.	Our	libido	is	tied	to	





the fact that the social allocation of resources is regulated through competition, 
while	the	allocation-game	itself	is	increasingly	dynamized,	too.	
Hence,	the	logic	of	competition	installs	the	fear	of	losing	out.	As	with	Max	Weber’s	
capitalist	 entrepreneur	 (Weber,	 1905:	 30),	 modern	 subjects	 find	 themselves	
unavoidably to be “on their way down”, like standing on a downward escalator or 
on a slipping slope, if they do not run uphill to improve their standings and keep 
track	with	the	changes	around	them	(cf.	Rosa,	2016).	Thus,	we	never	simply	“have”	
the resources we need; if we do not increase, optimize and improve them, they are 
about	to	corrode,	decay	and	dwindle.	So	what	is	driving	modern	subjects	to	stay	in	
the	race,	to	a	large	extent,	is	their	fear	of	virtual	social	death.	Sure,	in	most	of	the	
so-called developed countries, even if you lose too much ground, you will not starve, 





As a result, the logic of incessant increase, the desire to grow, run and enhance is 
firmly	anchored	in	the	habitual	structure	of	modern	subjectivity.	In	fact,	it	is	doubly	
entrenched in the modern character : as the desire to improve our resource 
base and as the fear	of	losing	out,	i.e.	of	losing	the	preconditions	for	a	good	life	
through	erosion	of	this	very	base.	Yet,	the	irresistible	desire in this arrangement, 
the attractive cultural force of the escalatory logic, cannot fully be grasped by 
pointing	 to	 the	 resource	 aspect	 alone.	 (Economic)	 Growth,	 (technological)	
acceleration and (sociocultural) innovation for modern subjects undeniably carry 
a	genuine	promise,	they	are	tied	to	our	conceptions	of	freedom	and	happiness.	
Why is “having more and moving faster” attractive for most modern subjects? It is, 
I want to argue, because the escalatory logic of dynamic stabilization is tied to the 
promise	of	increasing	our	individual	and	collective	scope	and	reach.	This	triggers	what	
I want to call the “Triple A Approach” to the good life: the modern way of acting 
and being-in-the world is geared towards making more and more of its qualities 
and	quantities	available,	accessible	and	attainable.	This	is	what	science	does,	and	what	
science promises: peering farther into the universe through our telescopes, looking 
deeper	 into	 the	micro-structure	of	matter	and	 life	 through	our	microscopes,	etc.	




accessible and attainable explains the lure of technology writ large: for a young kid, 
the	first	bike	brings	his	or	her	 friends	on	the	other	side	of	 the	village	within	 the	
horizon	of	availability,	the	first	moped	enlarges	this	circle	to	the	neighboring	village,	
while the car expands the horizon of the world which is accessible on a regular 
basis	to	the	larger	cities	around,	and	the	airplane,	finally,	brings	New	York,	Rio,	Tokyo	
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all of our friends, and all the digitalized knowledge and images of the earth, straight 
into	our	pockets.
The power of the Triple A Approach to the good life can be felt also in the attractivity 
of	 cities	 for	modern	 subjects.	Almost	universally	 across	 the	modern	world,	most	
people, and certainly of young people, want to live in large cities rather than in 
small	villages.	Ask	them	why:	because	in	the	city,	you	have	the	mall,	the	cinema,	the	
theater, the zoo, the museum, the big stadiums, all within your everyday reach, within 
the	horizon	of	availability.	And	it	explains,	in	part,	why	knowledge	and	education	are	
attractive even beyond their use as a resource base: Learn English, or Chinese, and 
you discover a whole new world of literature and art, culture and shopping, the whole 
universe	of	 that	 language	becomes	available	 for	you,	 for	example.	 In	this	way,	 the	
world is turned into a disposable place, so to speak, with money, education and 
technology	supplying	the	charms	for	incessantly	increasing	our	reach	and	scope.
Hence, culturally as well as structurally, modern society entrenches and even 
enforces a very particular stance and attitude towards the world, a stance that is 
defined	by	the	logic	of	increase,	control	and	augmentation1.
Alienation and Pollution  
– Or: What is wrong with the Triple A Approach?
So far, I have tried to sketch out that we are driven by the desire to expand our 
horizon	of	 the	available,	 attainable	and	accessible.	Our	conception	of	 the	good	
life is rooted in the idea that we can “gain” the world, that we can unlock it, make 
it	“legible”	(Blumenberg,	1981)	and	get	its	treasures	and	secrets	speak	to	us.	Yet,	
most unfortunately, when we look at our current sociocultural predicament, this 
strategy	seems	to	have	failed	thoroughly,	and	in	a	twofold	way.	First,	of	course,	there	
is a widespread and growing sense across the world that we do not so much gain 
and	dispose	of	the	world	than	destroy	and	endanger	it.	This	sense	is	most	vivid	in	
environmental concerns that in the mode of dynamic stabilization, through incessant 
growth and acceleration, we damage and destroy, impoverish and reduce, pollute 
and	poison	our	natural	surroundings.	In	our	late	modern	world,	“nature”	has,	quite	
paradoxically, become synonymous with the unattainable, non-available “other” on 
the	one	hand	and	with	something	we	are	guilty	of	destroying	on	the	other.	This,	
in turn, leads to the backlash of an unleashed nature striking out in tsunamis and 
typhoons,	avalanches	and	droughts,	viruses	and	bacteria	resistant	to	antibiotics.	The	
1  Of	course,	this	argument	is	strikingly	similar	to	the	conceptions	of	the	first	generation	of	critical	theorists	





natural world, instead of being made available, attainable and accessible, in many 
respects	appears	to	become	endangered	and	dangerous	instead.	This	relationship	
with what modern subjects still perceive to be their living and breathing, responsive 
natural surrounding certainly does not correspond to the way of being-in-the-
world	that	the	strategy	of	increasing	our	reach	and	scope	was	aiming	at.	
Yet,	when	we	 look	 at	 the	 cultural	 history	 of	modernity,	 there	 is	 a	 second,	 even	
more	disturbing	sense	in	which	this	very	strategy	turns	out	to	be	paradoxical.	For	
ever since the 18th century, when the shift to the mode of dynamic stabilization 
occurred, modernity has been haunted by the fear, and by the manifest experience, 
that	the	world	seems	to	recede	in	parallel	with	the	increase	of	our	hold	over	it.	In	a	
phenomenological	perspective,	we	appear	to	lose	the	world	as	we	make	it	available.	
In cultural self-observations of modernity as well as in social theory and philosophy, 
this process has been observed from many different angles: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
for example, experienced it when he disputed the gains allegedly made through 
progress and interpreted them as a genuine loss in the quality of our being-in-the-
world,	testified	in	the	shift	from	amour-de-soi to amour propre (Rousseau, 1750); Karl 
Marx	identified	it	as	a	fivefold	process	of	alienation from work, from the products 
of work, from nature, from our fellow human beings and in the end from ourselves 




conceptions, there looms the shadow of a world turned shallow and silent, mute and 
deaf	through	our	very	attempt	to	control	and	commodify	it.	Alienation	has	come	
to serve as the keyword for a world which has become cold and grey, harsh and 
non-responding, experienced by a subject that inwardly feels deaf, mute, cold, and 
empty,	too.	We	find	this	sense	of	a	serious	loss	of	the	world,	of	its	slipping	away	from	
us,	in	other	traditions	of	social	philosophy,	too:	in	Émile	Durkheim’s	conception	of	
anomia (and his notions of anomic and egoistic forms of suicide; Durkheim, 1897), 
in	Georg	Simmel’s	identification	of	a	blasé	attitude	towards	the	things	and	events	





that we cannot but shout and yell at a world which never answers because it is, in 
its	innermost	core,	cold	and	indifferent	or	even	hostile	to	us	(Camus,	1942).	Finally,	
for Hannah Arendt (1958), human subjects lose the world if they lose their capacity 
for	 joint,	 creative	 political	 action	 –	 irrespective	 of	 how	 successful	 they	might	 be	
economically	and	technologically.
This failure of the triple A strategy towards the good life is felt most vividly in the 
psychological state of “burnout”, which has become the iconic fear and disease 
of	late-modernity	(cf.	Ehrenberg,	2010).	People	who	suffer	a	thorough	burnout	
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–	however	problematic	its	exact	medical	definition	may	be	–	experience	exactly	
that: a world which has turned hard and cold, grey or black, dead and deaf for 
them,	while	they	inwardly	feel	empty	and	drained,	too.	Burnout thus is the most 
radical form of alienation in the sense of a complete loss or lack of a responsive, 
“warm”	connection	with	life	and	with	the	world.	If	my	diagnosis	of	the	receding	
of	the	world	as	the	flipside	of	our	making	it	available,	accessible	and	attainable	
is correct, it is small wonder that “burnout” has become the dominant cultural 
fear precisely in those social contexts where the Triple A Strategy has been most 
successful	and	where	there	is	an	abundance	of	resources.
So the question arises: What has gone wrong? Why did modernity betray our 
hopes and fail to deliver its promise? In order to answer this, we have to go back 
one more time and ask: Why was bringing the world within reach and scope so 
attractive	for	us	moderns	in	the	first	place?	What	was the promise by which we 
were led in this strategy? To put it straightforwardly: I believe that at the heart of it, 
we are driven by the idea that through increasing scope and reach we can improve 
the	quality	of	our	relating	to	the	world.	The	desire	to	increase	our	physical,	material	
and	social	range	is	driven	by	the	hope	that	we	can	find	the	right place for us, that 
we meet the people we really want to live with, the job that actually	satisfies	us,	
the religion or worldview which is truly ours, the books that actually talk to us and 
the music that speaks to us,	etc.	Thus,	in	the	end,	we	hope,	we	will	arrive	at	a	form	
of life that turns the world into a living, breathing, speaking, responsive, “enchanted” 
world.	Alas,	as	I	have	tried	to	point	out,	instead	of	arriving	there,	we	end	up	turning	
the business of increasing our scope and horizon of the available, attainable and 
accessible and collecting resources into an end in itself, into an endless, escalatory 
cycle	which	permanently	erodes	its	own	basis	and	thus	leads	nowhere.	Let	me	try	
one	small,	idiosyncratic	example:	think	of	the	way	we	relate	to	books	and	to	music.	
For many modern subjects, literature and music have become central “axes” 
or elements of a good life, crucial albeit somewhat luxurious indicators for the 
quality	of	life;	a	sphere	in	which	they	seek	and	find	moments	of	happiness.	For	
decades, it has become a cultural routine for many people (certainly not just 
academics and intellectuals) to gradually build up collections of records, or cds, 
and	a	private	library.	As	time	has	become	an	increasingly	scarce	commodity,	while	
music and books have become more and more easily attainable and affordable, 
very often the books and cds or records thus collected are never really or fully 
read	or	heard.	They	are	stored	away	in	shelves	and	cases	for	possible	future	use.	
They are acquired as mere potential, but they are not, or not fully, appropriated 
in	the	true	sense	of	“consumption”.	For	to	consume	a	book	or	a	record	does	
not mean to buy them	but	to	read	or	to	listen	to	them.	When	we	read	a	book	
or listen to a piece of music in the full sense of it, we have a chance of being 
drawn in, being touched and affected by it, and to some extent even of being 
transformed	by	it.	Very	often,	people	refer	to	their	most	intense	and	rewarding	




permanently available and accessible books and music through acquisition does 
not	necessarily	or	directly	translate	into	an	increase	in	the	quality	and/or	quantity	
of	 intense	cultural	experiences	of	 this	 latter	sort.	 In	 fact,	 there	might	even	be	
a negative correlation that parallels the macro-story I just told in the section 
before.	As	we	find	less	and	less	time	to	delve	into	a	book	or	a	piece	of	music,	we	
seem	to	develop	an	increasing	appetite	to	acquire	more	of	them.	This	appears	
to be an almost “natural” side-effect of dynamic stabilization: literature and 
music as commodities become progressively cheaper, while the time taken to 
read a book or actually listen to an opera gets comparatively more “expensive”2.	
Thus, instead of listening to the 170 cds comprised in The Complete Mozart (or 
the complete Pink Floyd recordings) we can easily acquire through the internet, 
which takes ages to do, acquiring the complete Beethoven (or Stones) collection 
as well for just 49,-- pounds, dollars or euros becomes an increasingly attractive 
alternative.	Yet,	the	likelihood	that	none	of	those	170	cds actually speaks to us 
increases	as	well.	
Now, interestingly, as the reader certainly will have noticed a while ago, we have 
already taken the next step in the logic of increasing our range and scope of 
cultural accessibility: younger people tend to no longer buy books and cds or 
dvds	–	 they	buy	mere	access	 instead.	For	 just	a	 few	bucks	a	month,	 they	get	
unlimited access	 to	 millions	 of	 books,	 albums	 and/or	 movies!	This	 seems	 like	
the	ultimate	realization	of	modernity’s	dream.	Yet,	more	often	than	not,	we	find	




images were carefully selected when taken and then individually stored in physical 
albums.	With	the	advent	of	fast	and	cheap	digital	imaging,	pictures	have	become	
abundantly	available	and	accessible.	We	can	make,	multiply	and	store	hundreds	
and thousands of them, and we do so with the hope that they will release their 




Thus, to sum up my argument so far, we have good reasons to assume that the 
good life in its essence is not a matter of scope (in money, wealth, options or 
capabilities),	but	a	particular	way	of	relating	to	the	world	–	to	places	and	people,	
to	 ideas	 and	bodies,	 to	 time	and	 to	nature,	 to	 self	 and	others.	 Increasing	 the	
scope	is	only	a	means	and	a	strategy	to	enable	or	facilitate	the	latter	–	it	becomes	
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The Resonance Conception of the Good life
Now,	if	the	two	claims	just	formulated	are	plausible	–	i.e.,	that	a)	the	good	life	is	
a matter of the way in which we are relating with and to the world, of our being 
in the world, and that b) dynamic stabilization and the Triple A Strategy lead to 
increasing alienation as a failed	 way	 of	 being	 and	 relating	 –	 then	 the	 question	







and instrumental connections and interactions, but the world (in all its qualities) 
cannot be appropriated by the subject, it cannot be made to “speak”, it appears 
to	be	without	sound	and	color.	Alienation	thus	is	a	relationship	which	is	marked	
by	the	absence	of	a	true,	vibrant	exchange	and	connection.	Between	a	silent	and	
grey world and a “dry” subject there is no life, both appear to be either “frozen” or 
genuinely	chaotic	and	mutually	aversive.	Hence,	in	the	state	of	alienation,	self	and	
world appear to be related in an utterly indifferent or even hostile way3.
But the true sense of alienation as I want to use it here only becomes comprehensible 
when	we	start	to	think	of	its	alternative.	Alienation’s	other	is	a	mode	of	relating	to	




by something, and in turn to develop intrinsic interest in the part of the world 
which	affects	us,	is	a	core	element	of	any	positive	way	of	relating	to	the	world.	And	




often tend to give a physical response by developing goose bumps, an increased 
rate	of	heartbeat,	 a	 changed	blood	pressure	 and	 skin	 resistance,	 etc.	 (Massumi,	
2002).	Resonance,	as	I	want	to	call	this	dual	movement	of	af←fection (something 
touches us from the outside) and e→motion (we answer by giving a response and 
thus	by	establishing	a	connection)	thus	always	and	inevitably	has	a	bodily	basis.	But	








resonance we experience, for example, in relationships of love or friendship, but 
also in genuine dialogue, when we play a musical instrument or in sports, but also 
very	often	 at	 the	workplace.	The	 receptive	 as	well	 as	 active	 connection	brings	
about	a	process	of	progressive	self-	and	world	transformation.	
Thus, resonance is not just built on the experience of being touched or affected, 
but	also	on	the	perception	of	what	we	can	call	self-efficacy4.	In	the	social	dimension,	
self-efficacy	is	experienced	when	we	realize	that	we	are	capable	of	actually	reaching	
out to and affecting others, that they truly listen and connect to us and answer in 
turn.	But	self-efficacy,	of	course,	can	also	be	experienced	when	we	play	soccer	or	
the piano, when we write a text we struggle with (and which inevitably speaks its 
own voice), and even when we stand at the shoreline of the ocean and “connect” 
with	the	rolling	waves,	the	water	and	the	wind.	Only	in	such	a	mode	of	receptive	
affection	and	responsive	self-efficacy	are	self	and	world	related	in	an	appropriative	
way: the encounter transforms both sides, the subject and the world experienced5.	
That resonances of this sort are vital elements of any identity-formation, can be 
read from the fact that claims such as after reading that book, or after hearing that 
music or meeting that group or climbing that mountain, I was a different person, are 





First, by a←fection in the sense of the experience of being truly touched or 
moved, second by e→motion as the experience of responsive (as opposed to 
purely	instrumental)	self-efficacy,	third	by	its	transformative	quality,	and	fourth	by	
an	 intrinsic	moment	of	elusiveness,	 i.e.	of	non-controllability	or	non-disposability.	
We can never simply establish resonance instrumentally or bring it about at will; it 
always	remains	elusive.	Put	differently:	whether	or	not	we	“hear	the	call”	is	beyond	
our	will	and	control.	This	in	part	is	due	to	the	fact	that	resonance	is	not	an	echo: 
it	 does	not	mean	 to	hear	oneself	 amplified	or	 to	 simply	 feel	 re-assured,	but	 it	
involves encounter with some real “other” that remains beyond our control, that 
speaks in its own voice or key different from ours and therefore remains “alien” 
to	us.	Even	more	than	this,	this	“other”	needs	to	be	experienced	as	a	source	of	
“strong	evaluation”	in	the	sense	of	Charles	Taylor.	Only	when	we	feel	that	this	other	
(which can be a person, but also a piece of music, a mountain, or a historical event, 
4  On	the	notion	of	self-efficacy,	see	Albert	Bandura	(1993).
5  Of course, the notorious problem with this claim is that it immediately provokes the objection that 
while the subject might well be transformed by the interaction with the violin or the ocean, the latter 
hardly	change.	But	while	this	argument	in	fact	depends	on	a	perhaps	not-so-innocent	epistemology	in	
which	the	only	things	capable	of	responding	are	human	beings,	i.e.	on	an	“asymmetrical	anthropology”	
(Latour,	1991,	cf.	Descola,	2005),	it	cannot	be	disputed	that	the	experienced world is affected by such 
encounters: What the violin and the ocean are for us changes progressively, and what they are as 
“things-in-themselves”	we	will	never	know.
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for example) has something important to tell or teach, irrespectively of whether 





is not just consonance or harmony; quite to the opposite: it requires difference and 
sometimes opposition and contradiction	 in	 order	 to	 enable	 real	 encounter.	Thus,	
in a completely harmonious or consonant world, there would be no resonance 
at	all,	for	we	would	be	incapable	of	discerning	the	voice	of	an	“other”	–	and	by	
consequence,	to	develop	and	discern	our	own	voice.	Yet,	a	world	in	which	there	
is only	 dissonance	 and	 conflict	 would	 not	 allow	 for	 experiences	 of	 resonance	
either.	Such	a	world	would	be	experienced	as	merely	repulsive.	In	short,	resonance	
requires difference that allows for the possibility of appropriation: of a responsive 
relationship	 that	 entails	 progressive,	 mutual	 transformation	 and	 adaptation.	
Resonance,	then,	is	a	condition	between	consonance	and	irrevocable	dissonance.	
Because of this, I am convinced the concept can provide a key to overcome the 




be stored or accumulated, and there cannot be a struggle for resonance either6.	
Therefore, resonance provides us with a conception of the good life that 
contradicts	 the	 logics	of	 increase	and	 the	Triple	A	Approach.	We	 immediately	
understand this when we think of what happens when we try to play our 
favorite piece of music ten times in a row, or every day: we do not increase our 
experience	of	resonance,	but	we	lose	it.	Similarly,	the	increase	in	our	database	of	
available music to millions of titles ready at hand does not, at least not necessarily, 
increase	the	likelihood	of	musical	resonance.
But the elusiveness and moment-like character of resonance does not mean that 
it	is	completely	random	and	contingent.	For	while	the	actual	experience	can	never	
be completely controlled and predicted (in fact, just as we expect it to happen 
most	 strongly,	 it	 is	 very	 likely	 that	we	will	 be	 disappointed	 –	Christmas	 Eve	 in	
family life might be a good case in point), there are two elements involved here 
which depend on social conditions and which therefore turn resonance into a 
concept	that	can	be	used	as	a	tool	for	social	criticism.	First,	subjects	individually	and	
collectively	 experience	 resonance	 typically	 along	particular	“axes”	of	 resonance.	
Thus,	 for	some,	music	provides	such	an	axis.	Whenever	they	go	to	the	concert	
hall, or to the opera, or the festival arena, they have a good chance of making that 
experience.	For	others,	it	will	be	the	museum,	the	library,	or	the	church,	the	forest	
or	the	shoreline.	More	than	that,	we	also	foster	social	relationships	that	provide	






all know that very often, our respective encounters remain indifferent or even 
repulsive.	And	just	as	much,	as	we	know	from	evidence	provided	by	the	sociology	
of labor (most instructive for this, Sennett, 2009), most people, or at least very 
many people, develop intense relationships of resonance with their work, not just 
with their colleagues at the workplace, but also with the materials and tasks they 
are	working	and	struggling	with.	Thus,	the	dough	“responds”	to	the	baker	as	does	
the haircut to the barber, the wood to the carpenter, the plant to the gardener, 
the	truck	to	the	trucker,	the	body	to	the	doctor	or	the	text	to	the	writer.	In	each	
of	 these	cases,	we	find	a	 true	 two-way-relationship	which	 involves	experiences	




material	 and	 existential	 dimensions	 of	 resonance.	 Social axes are those that 
connect	us	with,	and	relate	us	to,	other	human	beings.	In	modern,	western-type	
societies since the romantic period, love, friendship, but also democratic citizenship 




I believe with philosophers like Karl Jaspers (1947), William James (1902), Martin 
Buber (1923) or Friedrich Schleiermacher (1799) that human subjects also seek 
and	find	“axes	of	resonance”	that	connect	them	with	and	relate	them	to	life,	or	
existence,	or	the	universe	as	such.	As	those	authors	tried	to	show	quite	convincingly,	
this is what brings about religious experiences, and what makes religion plausible 
in	the	first	place.	To	me,	the	central	element	of	the	bible,	or	the	Koran,	is	the	idea	
that at the root of our existence, at the heart of our being, there is not a silent, 




connects	 his	 innermost	 core	 with	 outermost	 reality.	The	 praying	 person	 turns	
inward	and	outward	at	the	same	time.	However,	of	course,	modernity	has	found	
other	axes	of	existential	resonance	that	do	not	depend	on	religious	ideas.	Nature,	
in particular, is experienced as an ultimate, comprehensive as well as responsive 
reality.	To	listen	to	the	voice	of	nature	has	become	a	central	idea	not	just	in	idealistic	
philosophy,	but	even	more	so	in	many	everyday	routines	and	practices.	Thus,	many	
people regularly claim that they need to get to the forest, or the mountains, or 
the	oceans	or	 deserts	 to	 find	 and	 feel	 themselves.	They	 believe	 they	 can	only	
“hear	themselves”	when	listening	to	the	silence	(or	the	music)	“out	there”.	Just	as	
in the case of prayer, they experience something like a thread that connects their 
innermost	nature	to	outer	reality.	In	a	strikingly	similar	way,	music	itself	opens	up	
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an analogous axis for the listener: when we close our eyes to experience a piece 
of	music,	we	turn	inward	and	outward	simultaneously.	And	something	very	similar	
happens in the case of other aesthetic experiences in the museum, the cinema or 
when	reading	a	book,	too.	Art, therefore, alongside nature has evolved into a central 
existential	axis	of	resonance	for	modern	subjects.	That	resonance	does	not	need	
to be a pleasant, harmonious experience, but can develop essentially disturbing 
aspects, can be learnt from experiences we might have with history as a powerful 
reality running through us, which connects us with those who came before and 
those who will come after us, a reality we cannot control or command but which 
nevertheless responds to our actions such that we can feel a certain sense of self-
efficacy.	Thus,	it	appears	to	be	a	not	so	infrequent	experience	that	young	people,	
when visiting a Nazi concentration camp, feel existentially struck and addressed; 
they feel a “call” to respond to the inhumanity of such a site which actually does 
change	their	lives	(cf.	Rosa,	2016:	500-514).
Now, while I take it that such concrete axes of resonance are not anthropologically 
given but rather culturally and historically constructed, the establishment of some 
such axes is nevertheless indispensable for a good life, for they provide contexts 
in	which	subjects	dispositionally	open	up	to	experiences	of	resonance.	To	shift	
into a mode of resonance requires that we take the risk to make ourselves 
vulnerable.	It	conceptually	requires	that	we	let	ourselves	be	touched,	and	even	
transformed,	 in	 a	 non-predictable	 and	 non-controllable	way.	Thus,	 in	 contexts	
where	we	are	 full	of	 fear,	or	 in	stress,	or	 in	a	fight-mode,	or	concentrated	on	
bringing about a certain result, we do not seek or allow for resonance; quite to 
the	contrary,	doing	so	would	be	dangerous	and	harmful.	Given	this,	it	becomes	
obvious that it would be foolish to require that we should always be in a mode of 
dispositional	resonance.	The	capacity	to	leave	this	mode,	to	distance	oneself	from	
the world, to take a cold, instrumental, analytical stance towards it, very obviously 
is a cultural achievement that is indispensable not just for keeping up the business 
of modern science and technology, but to actually provide and safeguard a form 
of	life	that	allows	for	human	resonance	in	the	three	dimensions	mentioned.
Towards a Social Critique of the Conditions  
of Resonance
With this conception in our toolkit, I believe that we can start to use resonance 




existential axes of resonance which allow for iterative and periodic reassurance 
of	“existential	 resonance”,	 i.e.	 of	 a	 resonant	 mode	 of	 being.	The	 possibility	 of	
such a good life, then, is endangered if the conditions for these axes and for the 
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dispositional mode of resonance on the side of the subjects are structurally or 
systematically	undermined.	The	institutional	mode	of	dynamic	stabilization,	so	my	
argument goes, does display the tendency and the potential for such a systematic 
undermining.	For	it	forces	subjects	into	a	mode	of	“dispositional	alienation”:	they	
are forced into a reifying, instrumental mode of relating to objects and subjects 
in order to increase and secure their resources, to speed-up and to optimize 
their	 equipment.	The	 pervasive	 logic	 of	 competition	 in	 particular	 undermines	
the possibility to get into a mode of resonance: if we have to outpace someone, 
we	cannot	resonate	with	him	or	her	at	the	same	time.	We	cannot	compete	and	
resonate simultaneously7.	 Furthermore,	as	we	know	 from	research	on	empathy	
and from neurological studies (Bauer, 2006), time-pressure actually works as a sure 
preventer	of	resonance.	If	we	are	short	on	time,	we	try	to	be	as	goal-directed	and	
focused	as	possible;	we	cannot	afford	being	touched	and	transformed.	The	same	is	
true, of course, if we are driven by fear.	Fear	forces	us	to	erect	barriers	and	to	close	
down our minds, it shifts us to a mode in which we precisely try not to be touched 
by	“the	world”.	Therefore,	the	conditions	of	resonance	are	such	that	they	require	
contexts of mutual trust and fearlessness; and these contexts in turn require time 
and	stability	as	background	conditions.	Finally,	the	pervasive	bureaucratic	attempts	
to	completely	control	processes	and	outcomes	in	order	to	ensure	their	efficiency	
and	 transparency,	 which	 define	 late-modern	 workplace	 conditions,	 are	 equally	
problematic for relationships of resonance, because they are incompatible with the 
latters’	elusiveness	and	transformative	potential.
I	 do	 not	 have	 the	 space	 to	develop	 a	 fine-grained	 analysis	 of	 contemporary,	 late-
modern	conditions	of	resonance	here	(cf.	Rosa,	2016,	Part	IV),	but	I	am	confident	that	
the	reader	will	find	it	a	plausible	claim	that	the	escalatory	logics	of	dynamic	stabilization	
and the corresponding Triple A Approach to the good life are rather detrimental to the 
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